

15-Year Planning Group Meeting Notes

21 June 1965

Introduction by Mr. Kirkpatrick.

1. Requested the names of Directorate representatives and instructed them that this would be a full time job. Said that he has been requested by the DCI to stay in the Agency an additional two weeks in order to get this job on the road.

2. He explained the Director's purpose for the long term plan indicating that while it is no longer called a 15-year plan the Director still wants a sharp view of the first five years and a more general view of the next ten years.

3. Will be Agency plan for foreseeable future (made reference to the Bross letter)-- [] should obtain a copy of letter from Bross' secretary.)

4. Stressed the DCI's view that long term plans often result in great increases, therefore, it is obligation of the group to consider economy measures, discontinuance of low priority programs, and to bear in mind that increased intelligence expenditures frequently obviate the need for large operational expenditures of the government.


5. Read the President's letter and said that copies would be made available to the group (who will do this -- ExDir or BPAM).

6. Ended by summarizing the above.

Meeting was open for general discussion. McMahan reported that BNE is reviewing the Assumptions. They are having a difficult time and that they will be changed considerably from the 28 May version. [] will produce Assumptions by 15 July.

[] remarked that this plan will probably lead to establishment of an Agency planning staff perhaps with representatives from each Directorate. [] said that an essential factor in planning is the role of CIA over the next 15 years. Kirkpatrick agreed that this is vital and said that the group must assume that the Agency's role remains the same in war as in peace. [] raised problem of the legal responsibilities assigned USIB agencies as compared with facts; e.g. State Department does not produce political intelligence. Clarke replied that issues such as this must be drawn clearly in the plan with recommended courses of action. [] on same subject said there is as yet no decision regarding national requirements for services of common concern; i.e. "special operations." This is very cloudy area and must be clarified.

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X1 [] said issues such as this must be taken up later. The first job of the group is to determine goals, problems and objectives, write these out and then decide what has to be done and who will do it (there was general agreement on this).

? said that the long term plan must be related to annual budgets or else it will be academic and valueless. (There was general agreement on this.)

X1 [] said assumptions may be too broad to provide answers to specific questions and the group may have to ask ONE for estimates in particular instances. Kirkpatrick said intelligence planning can never guess what national planners are thinking. This presents a problem. For example, intelligence planning could never have anticipated the Administration's reaction to the Dominican situation. ~~and Kirkpatrick requested all representatives to read the 28 May plan outline and to meet Wednesday at 11 o'clock.~~

Kirkpatrick requested all representatives to read the 28 May Plan Outline and to meet Wednesday at 11 o'clock. [] suggested brainstorming of issues and long-term goals. (There was general agreement.)

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